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In this paper, I subject a number of statements avowing selective doubt about an act of thinking to philosophical 
analysis (e.g., “A thought occurred just now but I do not believe that I was thinking it”) to ascertain those 
circumstances under which they constitute a legitimate expression of scepticism. Can a case be made for 
epistemic discrepancy sufficient to justify the following claim: “I doubt that I think that thought but not this 
one”? In support of selective scepticism, I discuss the ontological and epistemic properties evident in an indirect 
form of Moore’s paradox which features beliefs about a thought and a thinker: notably, “I experienced a thought 
just now but I do not believe that I was thinking it”. I argue that the conjunction above contains conjuncts which 
are ontologically equivalent but epistemically distinct. This difference explains not only why the statement is 
indirectly Moore paradoxical but how selective scepticism over thought might be justified. To further support 
my claim for the legitimacy of selective scepticism, I consider research on how a child acquires beliefs about 
thinking, and speculate over the cause of a rare pathological condition known as thought insertion. 
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PART 1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Is there not some God, or some other being by whatever name we call it, who puts these reflections into 
my mind? (Descartes (1641/1997, §24; emphasis added) 
 
The question above forms part of Descartes’ Second Meditation. In its original context, and 
without the added emphasis, Descartes is entertaining the possibility that all of his thoughts 
(his reflections) are exogenous. By adding the emphasis, however, I wish to create the sense 
in which Descartes, rather than expressing ubiquitous doubt over the source of his thoughts – 
that they are thoughts he is thinking (as we traditionally, and rightly, take him to be doing) – 
is here being more selective. In this amended version of his Second Meditation, let us allow 
that he is sceptical about the origin of these thoughts, specifically, whatever these thoughts 
happen to be. 
If we accept as necessary the connection between a thought and a thinker, such that 
the existence of a thought entails a thinker of that thought, is selective scepticism over 
thought ever justified? To illustrate, consider the following example taken from a patient 
suffering from thought insertion (a condition we will return to in Section 6): 
 
3 
 
[S]he said that sometimes it seemed to be her own thought… ‘but I don’t get the feeling that it is’. She 
said her ‘own thoughts might say the same thing… but the feeling isn’t the same… the feeling is that it is 
somebody else’s…’ (Taken from Allison-Bolger 1999, #68, cited in Hoerl 2001, p.190) 
 
Here, the subject is distinguishing between thought she takes to be her own and 
thought she does not. Is such a distinction ever legitimate such that I (or anyone) could 
(legitimately) make the following claim: I doubt that I think that thought but not this one? To 
be clear, I am not asking whether it is ever legitimate to entertain the possibility that one 
could doubt that one is thinking certain thoughts; after all, that is precisely what I am doing 
here and Descartes is doing in my amended version of his Second Meditation. Rather, I am 
concerned with the legitimacy of the proposition: I doubt that I think that thought but not this 
one. My query does not stem from a motivation to challenge the entailment between thinker 
and thought. As noted, for the purposes of this paper, I accept this without defence. Instead, I 
am interested in whether, epistemically, I could ever be justified in doubting that a particular 
thought is one that I think, as illustrated by the example of ‘thought insertion’ above. 
The aim of this paper is to subject a number of statements avowing selective doubt 
about an act of thinking to philosophical analysis, in order to ascertain those circumstances 
under which they constitute a legitimate expression of scepticism. I intend to show that there 
is an unconventional sense in which one could justify selective scepticism with regard to 
thought and who is thinking it – namely, adopting the view from nowhere – but that the 
unconventional nature of this example risks trivializing the scepticism involved (Section 2). 
That said, the introduction of an ‘objective stance’ does highlight the seemingly important 
role played by perspectivity in abating scepticism. I say ‘abating’ rather than ‘eradicating’ 
because I intend to illustrate, through the use of an indirect form of Moore’s paradox, how 
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selective scepticism may be granted a degree of legitimacy under certain circumstances, even 
in the case of thinking thoughts constitutive of one’s perspective (Sections 3 & 4). What these 
circumstances are, and therefore what might constitute a reason for one’s scepticism, will be 
considered in Part 2 when discussing how a child develops an awareness of the act of 
thinking (Section 5) and the rare pathological condition known as thought insertion (Section 
6). 
 
2. Selective scepticism 1: Adopting the view from nowhere 
Consider the following claim: 
 
D1 I doubt (qua do not believe) that I think that thought but not this one. 
 
D1 discriminates between thoughts that I doubt thinking and thoughts that I do not. Is this 
discrimination ever justified? 
One defence of D1 requires that we adopt an objective stance, or what Nagel (1986) 
refers to as the view from nowhere. Assuming the possibility of other minds, there are 
countless thoughts which I do not think or have any direct awareness of (nor do I hold the 
belief that I do). Thoughts are being generated every moment of every day which I have no 
direct involvement in or access to. From an objective stance – when conceiving of the whole 
of thought – it would appear to be perfectly legitimate (and indeed rational) for me to doubt 
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that I think those thoughts.
1
 But if I were to adopt an objective stance, then given the nature 
of this stance, what would be the basis for my differentiation of those thoughts from, say, 
these thoughts, or simply that one from this? In other words, how am I to identify and so 
discriminate thoughts it is legitimate for me to doubt that I think from thoughts it is not? 
Adopting the view from nowhere means that there are an indeterminate number of thoughts 
in existence at any given time; thoughts with different content and (let us allow, pace Russell 
and Nietzsche)
2
 different thinkers. But, to reiterate, how is each thought individuated such 
that I am able to pick out one particular thought from another in a way that justifies doubting 
that I think that thought, specifically, and therefore for the corresponding proposition 
regarding my doubt of that thought to be legitimate? 
Borrowing from Williams (1978), when adopting an objective stance, the problem of 
individuation can be illustrated as follows: take the thought (T1) “I believe that this is true” 
and the thought (T2) “I do not believe that this is true”. Where the demonstrative pronoun is 
referring to the same thing, both of these thoughts cannot be expressing a truth unless (T1) 
and (T2) constitute the content of different thought-worlds: for in the same thought-world, it 
cannot be the case that whatever this is referring to is both believed and not believed to be 
true.
3
 If each thought is to be upheld as legitimate, then the contradictory content of (T1) and 
                                                          
1 One could also argue, in this case, that in addition to doubting that I think those thoughts, one is justified in 
believing that those thoughts are not thoughts that I think. The focus of this paper, however, is on what 
constitutes evidence to justify selective scepticism. I do not intend to discuss what might constitute sufficient 
grounds for a belief (even a belief that something is not the case). 
2 Although I say pace Russell and Nietzsche (see Nietzsche 1886/2003, pp.45-6, and Russell 1927/1970, p.171, 
as well as 1946/1961, p.550), in a sense this is unnecessary because these authors question the certainty with 
which Descartes, using his method of doubt, could legitimately claim to know that there is an ‘I’ which thinks 
and not necessarily that an ‘I’ which thinks, or is the subject of thought, exists. This epistemological objection 
was, of course, first raised by Lichtenberg (1806/1990). 
3 The normative position alluded to here is based on the law of non-contradiction, whereby believing ɸ and not 
believing ɸ is contradictory. Following the law of non-contradiction, if one were to believe ɸ, and equally not 
believe ɸ, then one would be considered irrational. Priest (2006), however, challenges this position. He accepts 
that, prima facie, a contradiction presents itself but adds that, on occasion, one could nevertheless rationally 
believe and not believe the truth of ɸ. By adopting dialetheism, Priest proposes the truth of some contradictions: 
for example, that the proposition “I always lie” is both true and false when uttered by a liar, thereby making it 
something that can be believed and not believed to be true. Given dialetheism, the law of non-contradiction is 
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(T2) requires that they are located in different thought-worlds, otherwise such contradictory 
content, contained within the same thought-world, would (in fact, should) be judged 
irrational.
4
 Based on an objective stance, contradictory content would seem to be sufficient 
for thought individuation, but only insofar as such a criterion (i.e., contradiction) individuates 
thoughts into different thought-worlds based on assumed rationality. Where one cannot 
assume rationality, the individuation of (T1) and (T2) into different thought worlds is not 
possible. 
Within the same thought-world, the following thoughts – (T3) “I doubt that that is 
true” and (T4) “I do not doubt that this is true” – can be true without fear of contradiction: for 
each demonstrative pronoun (‘this’ and ‘that’) is picking out a different event the truth of 
which is either doubted or not doubted. Importantly, though, the same can be said of these 
thoughts irrespective of whether they are from the same or different thought-worlds. Given 
this, in the case of (T3) and (T4), the problem of individuation remains. From an objective 
stance, how do we know if (T3) and (T4) belong to the same or different thought-worlds? 
With examples (T3) and (T4), it is not even the case that the first person pronoun ‘I’ is 
able to distinguish between thoughts in terms of individuating thought-worlds. Each thought 
could be from the same or a different thought-world, with ‘I’ (as an indexical term) referring 
either to someone different or the same person depending on which thought-world the two 
thoughts are from. In order to overcome the problem of thought individuation in the absence 
of contradictory content and assumed rationality, there needs to exist some kind of identity 
relation in which the ‘I’ refers to (and is understood to refer to) that which constitutes a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
not universally accepted (I thank the anonymous reviewer for bringing this fact to my attention). Nevertheless, 
the possibility of the truth of contradictions, and therefore the possibility of contradictory beliefs, does not 
threaten the point I am making. If anything, it adds to the problem of individuating thought under the 
circumstances described. 
4
 Again, such a normative claim is based on the law of non-contradiction (see footnote 3). 
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particular thought-world. Consider, then, (T5) ‘A thinks “I believe that this is true”’, and (T6) 
‘B thinks “I do not believe that that is true”’. Thought individuation is made apparent if and 
therefore because (in this case) there exists a different identity relation in each thought’s 
respective use of ‘I’. In (T5), ‘I’ refers to A, and in (T6) it refers to B, although it could 
simply refer to ‘not A’. Adapting D1 so that it can be expressed from an objective stance, we 
get: 
 
D2 I (qua A) doubt that I think that thought (where the demonstrative pronoun ‘that’ refers to 
the content of a thought-world individuated as ‘not A’) but not this thought (where the 
demonstrative pronoun ‘this’ refers to the content of the thought-world individuated by A). 
 
What does A represent? It represents a particular thought-world and therefore a 
particular perspective. The figurative use of A signifies this point of view and the thoughts 
constitutive of this point of view are these thoughts (the only thoughts of this perspective). 
The use of the first-person pronoun ‘I’, in being indexical, is fixed to a given perspective (this 
perspective, in this case), figuratively individuated by A. The certainty with which ‘I’ 
constitutes something more than an indexical that is attached to a particular perspective 
(figuratively individuated by A or ‘not A’, as the case may be) and instead identifies a 
substantive subject of thought (in the shape of, say, Descartes’ res cogitans), is beyond the 
scope of this paper to discuss. Suffice it to say that all that is needed for this discussion is for 
there to exist a belief that ‘I’ refers to the substantial subject of this perspective. When 
understood in this way, and in accordance with D2, the thought “I doubt that I think that 
thought but not this one” expresses a legitimate doubt. 
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Of course, under D2, I do not experience the thought I doubt thinking as if from 
nowhere; instead, I only conceive of it as belonging to a different thought-world, and 
therefore a different perspective, even if this perspective is simply understood as ‘other than 
mine’.5 As Williams (1978) notes when referring to the particular perspective constitutive of 
that which I (qua A) experience, which he calls Cartesian reflection: “There is nothing in the 
pure Cartesian reflection to give us that perspective [the view from nowhere]. The Cartesian 
reflection merely presents, or rather invites us into, the perspective of consciousness” (p.100; 
emphasis added). Cartesian reflection, by inviting us into consciousness, is perspectival; and 
in being perspectival, there is something-it-is-like to have thoughts (thoughts constitutive of a 
particular point of view; see Nagel, 1974). As Williams informs us, from this perspective – 
which I will call my perspective – experiential events either happen for me or they do not. I 
cannot experience events as happening outside of this perspective. Indeed, the quotation from 
Descartes’ Second Meditation presented at the start of this paper reflects this perspectival 
requirement: for Descartes scepticism concerns thoughts ‘located’ within his mind and 
therefore constitutive of his perspective. 
If the demonstrative pronoun ‘that’ is referring to a thought-event in a different 
thought-world, identified figuratively as ‘not A’, then, given my restricted (and unique) 
perspective, within the phrase “I doubt that I think that thought”, the term ‘that’, for it to be 
legitimate, must be referring to a thought-event outside my experience. If it is a thought I 
cannot experience, then I do not stand in any first-person epistemic relation to it. At best, it 
refers to something which I either conceive as a possibility or come to believe occurs in 
virtue of some mediated third-person epistemic relation – some inference – based on my folk 
                                                          
5 For the sake of argument, I assume the existence of other minds (therefore other thought-worlds). I therefore 
assume that there is sufficient evidence to justify the belief in the existence of other minds, even if this evidence 
is not direct experiential evidence. What I doubt, based on a lack of direct experiential evidence, is that I think 
those thoughts. 
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psychology interpretation of the actions of another (e.g., if I see S put up his umbrella then I 
infer the existence of the belief “it is raining”). In contrast, the demonstrative pronoun ‘this’, 
in referring to a thought I do not doubt, must be referring to something which I experience (in 
virtue of constituting a thought-event from within my perspective) and therefore something 
which I stand in a first-person epistemic relation to. Let us re-consider D2, this time taking 
into account the fact that my unique perspective necessarily provides a means of 
differentiating thought-events which I experience from those which I do not. D2 therefore 
becomes: 
 
D3 I doubt that I think that thought (where ‘that’ refers to some indeterminate thought – from 
within thought-world ‘not A’ – whose existence I can only conceive of and infer rather than 
experience directly, and so cannot stand in a first-person epistemic relation to), but not this 
thought (where ‘this’ refers to a thought-event constitutive of my perspective which I 
experience directly and therefore stand in a first-person epistemic relation to). 
 
According to D3, what justifies my doubt that I am thinking that thought but not this 
one is my lack of direct experience of the former thought. That which I experience, I refer to 
using the demonstrative ‘this’ and (according to D3) consider the fact that I experience it (and 
therefore stand in a first-person epistemic relation to it) sufficient to make illegitimate any 
claim about doubting that I think it. A thought I do not experience I refer to using the 
demonstrative ‘that’, and the fact that I can only conceive of it occurring (and stand in a 
10 
 
mediated third-person epistemic relation to it) justifies my doubt that I think it.
6
 What this 
means in terms of the use of demonstratives, of course, is that, in the context in which they 
are employed, ‘that’ refers to an experiential event of which I can only conceive (namely, the 
occurrence of any indeterminate thought from outside of my perspective) whereas ‘this’ 
refers to a particular experiential event that only I can experience.
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It is worth noting that underlying D3 is a more refined version of the ontological 
position stated earlier – ‘a thought necessitates a thinker’ – in which the assumption is now 
that a thought I experience (a thought within my thought-world) necessitates that I am its 
thinker (henceforth ‘author’). I do not wish to dispute this ontological position. Instead, I seek 
to challenge the epistemic relationship described within D3 which complements it (namely, 
that I do not doubt thinking this thought: the one I experience). It is my contention that the 
assertion that I do not doubt thinking the thought I experience (in virtue of experiencing it), if 
interpreted as necessitating that I cannot legitimately doubt thinking it (which is a reasonable 
interpretation of D3) is erroneous. To understand why, consider the following statement: 
 
(1) A thought occurred just now but I do not believe that I was thinking it. 
 
Statement (1) is entirely consistent with D3. There are lots of thoughts occurring right now 
that I am not thinking; it is therefore quite legitimate for me to doubt that I am thinking any 
of these. In light of this, consider statement (2): 
                                                          
6
 It is the case, of course, that I do not experience thoughts occurring at the subpersonal level (that is, below the 
level of conscious awareness). The extent to which one is justified in doubting these thoughts would make for an 
interesting discussion that, unfortunately, is beyond the scope of this paper. 
7
 For simplicity’s sake, I am using the term ‘thought’ in the context of an experiential state to mean something 
linguistic rather than, say, pictorial (an image). Thus, the thought I experience is, for example, the phrase 
“Marry, Mary, quite contrary”, rather than the image of a young lady tending her garden. 
11 
 
 
(2) I experienced a thought just now but I do not believe I was thinking it 
 
Statement (2) is not consistent with D3. At first glance, this may not appear to be a problem. 
After all, statement (2) seems a rather odd, perhaps even contradictory, thing to say; so why 
be concerned if a proposition that is likely to be illegitimate is inconsistent with D3? 
To understand why statement (2) is potentially problematic for D3, we first need to 
understand that statement (2) expresses what I am claiming is an indirect form of Moore’s 
paradox. It is indirectly Moore paradoxical because it lacks the formal structure of Moore’s 
paradox (as I will demonstrate below) whilst retaining a seeming contradictory set of 
conjuncts (indicative of Moore’s paradox). On closer inspection, however, the first conjunct 
(concerned with experiencing a thought) does not contradict the second conjunct (not 
believing that I was thinking the thought) unless one enforces the entailment between 
experiencing a thought and thinking it. But even if one accepts that ‘I am experiencing p’ 
entails ‘I am thinking p’ (an ontological claim), this does not negate the possibility that one’s 
epistemic relationship to the thought is such that there are nevertheless grounds – based on 
the nature of this epistemic relationship – for doubting that one is the author of the thought, 
and, importantly, that these grounds are justified. 
A closer examination of the indirect form of the paradox is therefore informative, as it 
reveals an epistemic disparity in the relationship between oneself (qua author) and the 
thought as expressed within the two conjuncts in (2), even where one tacitly accepts the 
assumption I have been making about the entailment between a thought and its thinker. It is 
my contention that this epistemic discrepancy, in the face of ontological equivalence (see 
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4.1), is what legitimizes statement (2)’s challenge to D3, thereby making erroneous the claim 
‘I do not doubt this thought because it is a thought I experience’ (where ‘do not’ is taken to 
mean ‘cannot’). This, in turn, opens up the possibility of justified doubt regarding one’s 
authorship of a thought one experiences, even when, owing to the ontological equivalence 
already noted, one is necessarily the author of the thought one has just experienced. 
In order to defend the claim that statement (2) is an indirect form of Moore’s paradox, 
and in order to gain further insight into what this reveals about the nature of the epistemic 
discrepancy said to exist in the presence of ontological equivalence, and how this makes 
legitimate the proposition ‘I doubt that I think that thought’ – where ‘that’ (contra D3) refers 
to a thought I experience – let us briefly consider the structure of a traditional Moore 
paradoxical utterance. 
 
3. Moore’s paradox 
The following is an example of Moore’s paradox: 
 
(3) I went to the cinema today but I do not believe that I did.
8
 
 
More formally, this can be written p & ~ IBp, where p equates to going to the cinema today, 
and ~ IBp represents not believing that I did.
9
 To those unfamiliar with Moore’s paradox, at 
first glance, the proposition may appear to be a simple case of contradiction and therefore a 
                                                          
8 Adapted from a version used by Moore (1942, p.543) 
9
 This is an example of the omissive form of the paradox. The paradox can also be presented in the commissive 
form: p & IB~ p (I went to the cinema today and I believe that I did not). Only the omissive form is discussed in 
this paper. This fact should not detract from the argument presented, however. 
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somewhat peculiar or even absurd thing to say. Certainly, any alleged paradox may not be 
immediately apparent to the reader. So what is paradoxical about statement (3)? 
The first conjunct (p) concerns some event in the world – a fact – which is either true 
or false: either I went to the cinema today or I did not (either p or ~ p must hold). The second 
conjunct (~ IBp) refers to some ‘inner’ mental state of mine which, independent of the first 
conjunct, can also be true or false depending on whether I hold the belief or not. As a 
consequence, the first conjunct has nothing to say about my mental states, and the second 
tells me nothing about my actual cinema-behaviour (Lawlor & Perry, 2008): for irrespective 
of whether I went to the cinema today, I can believe that I did or not. The truth or falsity of p 
is not therefore dependent on the truth or falsity of my belief about p, in much the same way 
as the truth or falsity of whether I hold a belief about p is not dependent on p.
10
  
Given the independence of each conjunct, it is possible that I went to the cinema 
today and equally possible that I do not believe that I did; just as (3) describes. Yet as Moore 
observed, even though each conjunct could be true – thus making the statement non-
contradictory – the assertion of the conjunction (I went to the cinema today but I do not 
believe that I did) remains an absurd thing to say because it implies a contradiction. What is 
paradoxical about p & ~ IBp, then, is that despite the fact that the conjunction as a whole can 
be true and therefore non-contradictory, it cannot be coherently asserted (Vahid, 2005). 
 
4. Selective scepticism 2: Evidence from an indirect form of Moore’s paradox 
Statement (2) has the appearance of a Moore paradoxical utterance although it does not 
conform to the formal structure found in (3). Instead, it takes the following form – q & ~ 
                                                          
10
 The same cannot be said for the truth or falsity of the content of the belief, of course – that is, what the belief 
is about – which is dependent on p (in this case, on whether I went to the cinema today or not). 
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IBp(q) – where q equates to ‘experiencing a thought just now’ and ~ IBp(q) equates to ‘not 
believing that I was thinking that thought’. Given this structure, the truth or falsity of q is 
independent of the truth or falsity of ~ IBp(q). For (2) to be Moore paradoxical, one would 
have to endorse the entailment between q and p(q), such that q (experiencing a thought just 
now) entails p(q) (thinking that thought). Only by endorsing such an entailment would 
statement (2) contain all the hallmarks of a Moore paradoxical utterance. To illustrate, 
consider statement (4): 
 
(4) I experienced a thought just now (which entails I was thinking it) but I do not believe that 
I was thinking it. 
 
Put differently, but reflecting the entailment in (4), the traditional Moorean structure (p & ~ 
IBp) becomes more evident when expressed as follows: 
 
(5) I was thinking a thought just now but I do not believe that I was thinking it 
 
4.1 Ontological equivalence; epistemic discrepancy 
The ontological implication of ‘q entails p(q)’ is that experiencing the thought and thinking it 
amount to the same event. This means that statements (2) and (5) are ontologically equivalent 
insofar as the mental event <experiencing a thought> is equivalent to the mental event 
<thinking that thought> even though they are differently described, at least within the first 
conjunct of conjunctions (2) and (5). Of course, where it is accepted that q is ontologically 
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equivalent to p(q) – more formally, q = p(q) – then it is somewhat unremarkable to add that q 
entails p(q). But if statements (2) and (5) are ontologically equivalent, insofar as they pick 
out the same mental event, then what is revealed by any further comparison between (2) and 
(5) is that the epistemic relationship between the first and second conjuncts described in (5) 
does not match the epistemic relationship the subject has with what we now understand to be 
the same mental event described in (2). This is evidenced by the fact that statement (5) 
expresses an epistemic relationship between the first and second conjuncts that is prima facie 
contradictory in a way that the relationship between the first and second conjuncts in 
statement (2) is not. 
To illustrate, the seeming contradiction within traditional Moore paradoxical 
utterances (p & ~ IBp) is often explained as follows: when uttered intelligently, ‘that p’ is 
understood to be equivalent to one’s belief that p (Evans, 1982; Williams, 2004). What is 
implied within statement (3) (I went to the cinema today but I do not believe that I did) is 
made explicit in statement (3*) ‘I believe I went to the cinema today but I do not believe that 
I did’. Transferring this to (2) (I experienced a thought just now but I do not believe that I 
was thinking it), we get (2*) ‘I believe I experienced a thought just now but I do not believe 
that I was thinking it’. What the subject believes within the first conjunct of (2*) is therefore 
not equivalent to what they believe within the first conjunct of (5), as is made even more 
apparent when expressed as follows: (5*) ‘I believe I was thinking a thought just now but I 
do not believe that I was thinking it’. The epistemic positions differ insofar as the subject 
believes, according to the first conjunct in (2*), that they have just experienced a thought, 
compared to believing they were thinking a thought (as claimed within the first conjunct of 
(5*)). Now, while the mental event that each belief is about may be ontologically equivalent, 
owing to the entailment between q and p(q) (as discussed), the manner in which each mental 
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event is described within the context of the belief expressed, which differs in the respective 
first conjuncts of statements (2*) and (5*), means that the epistemic relationship the subject 
has with the mental event is not equivalent. As a result of this difference (and to reiterate my 
earlier claim), the epistemic relationship between the first and second conjuncts of statement 
(2*) is not prima facie contradictory, unlike that found in statement (5*). 
Given the prima facie contradiction inherent in statement (5*) but absent from (2*), 
consider the following remark by Shoemaker (1995): “what can be coherently believed 
constrains what can be coherently asserted” (p.227). In the case of (5*), Shoemaker’s 
constraint clearly applies because what is believed is prima facie contradictory (as noted) and 
therefore cannot be coherently asserted. But what about (2*)? Here, what is believed is not 
prima facie contradictory, even though what is believed cannot be true given the entailment 
between q and p(q) and the ontological implication of this. Given that there is no prima facie 
contradiction in (2*), might there be grounds to justify those beliefs underlying the assertion 
found in (2*), thus making the proposition ‘I doubt that I think that thought but not this one’ 
legitimate? 
As a means of considering this question, in Part 2 I present findings from the field of 
developmental psychology indicating that children learn – qua acquire the belief – that the 
thoughts they experience are their thoughts that they think. The association between a thought 
and its thinker, then, irrespective of whether one endorses the ontological position presented 
here, is not an epistemic given. In other words, it does not constitute innate knowledge that 
we possess but, rather, is something we come to believe over time. If we acquire this belief 
then one might conjecture that such a belief is open to change, such that under certain 
circumstances one might come to doubt the association between thought and thinker. When 
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speculating about what these circumstances might be, I draw on contemporary explanations 
of thought insertion to inform my discussion. 
 
PART 2 
 
5. Developing an awareness of thinking 
According to Flavell, Green and Flavell, (1995; see also Flavell, 1999), preschool children 
(aged between 3 and 5) understand that thinking is a private activity which occurs ‘in-the-
head’. Around this time, they also acquire an understanding of themselves as ‘knowers’: that 
their thoughts amount to a source of knowledge for them (Kuhn, 2000). Preschoolers are, 
however, poor at identifying when someone is thinking, even in the case of their own 
thoughts. They do not assume, for example, that they must have been thinking when engaged 
in a task (Flavell, Green & Flavell, 1993); neither do they always show an understanding of 
what they might have been thinking about or even what others might be presently thinking 
about in a given context (Flavell et al., 1995). In fact, Flavell and Wong (2009) conclude that, 
to a large extent, preschoolers severely underestimate the amount of mental activity taking 
place within a person (including themselves) at any given time.
11
 They fail to realise (it 
seems) that individuals, including themselves, experience a continual flow of mental content; 
an unstoppable stream of consciousness (James, 1890) – what Harris (1995) calls an 
“involuntary pulsation” (p.51) – even in someone who may not be trying to think of anything 
in particular (see Flavell, Green & Flavell, 1998). This has led Flavell, Green, Flavell and Lin 
                                                          
11 Interestingly, preschoolers are likely to overestimate the ‘strength’ of their memory; claiming prior to a 
memory test that they will remember far more of the items to be recalled (sometimes all of them) than they 
actually do (Lipko, Dunlosky & Merriman, 2009; Van Overschelde, 2008). 
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(1999) speculatively to claim that “children are less aware than adults of the experiential, 
what-it-is-like-to-have-them, aspects of conscious mental states such as thoughts and 
percepts, and instead focus almost exclusively on their cognitive content” (p.411). In short, 
an accurate description of the preschoolers’ ability is that these children are introspectively 
aware of thought content before they begin to understand what thinking is (that it involves a 
thinker, for example), let alone that they themselves continually engage in thinking. 
Alongside this general lack of awareness of the fact that they are thinking, preschoolers 
show little understanding of cognitive cueing (Gordon & Flavell, 1977). They do not appear 
to understand that mental events trigger other mental events, usually in a coherent manner 
related to one’s experiences. Thus, Flavell et al. (1995) describe young children’s concept of 
thought as being quite different to adults. 
 
First, the concept of a thought (thinking, mental activity etc.) is doubtless less salient for them than it is 
for most adults; they do not think about thoughts very often spontaneously. When they are brought to 
think about them, however, they are more likely than adults to regard them as isolated and largely 
inexplicable mental happenings, not linked to preceding cues or subsequent effects. Although they may 
occasionally become aware that something instigated a thought (e.g., an instruction to think, an 
emotionally arousing situation) or that a thought instigated something (e.g. an action based on that 
thought), the question of possible causes and effects usually does not even arise for them when thinking 
about thinking. (pp.84-5) 
 
It would seem that even if preschoolers do demonstrate awareness of the act of 
thinking, because they lack an understanding of cognitive cueing, it is not equivalent to the 
older child/adult’s awareness of their stream of consciousness. Instead, this awareness, such 
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as it is, is of isolated islands of thought. Moreover, because preschoolers lack sustained 
awareness of their own mental activity – owing to their sporadic ability to perform meta-
cognition (or reflexive thinking) – they are less likely to be aware of their own ‘mental 
history’ (Flavell et al., 1995; Flavell, Green & Flavell, 2000). So, when performing a task 
which requires them to express their thoughts, the process by which they arrive at a given 
solution or judgement will be less accessible to them compared to older children and adults. 
As such, by the time children enter kindergarten, the child’s ability to perform metcognitions 
is only rudimentary and effortful (Dimmitt & McCormick, 2012). Therefore, if distracted, 
such that their thoughts ‘stray’, they may be less likely to notice that this distraction has 
impacted their own thinking, resulting in the production of less relevant thoughts. In fact, on 
those limited occasions when a preschooler is aware of the fact that she is thinking x, she 
remains largely ignorant of the fact that this process forms part of her continuous stream of 
consciousness, and to whether it was a thought she initiated (through the process of cognitive 
cueing) or was unbidden (Flavell et al., 1998). 
Preschoolers understand that thoughts are private inner entities, but this does not 
necessitate that they further equate inner and private with personal ownership (either with 
these thoughts being my thoughts, or with them being thoughts I think); nor are they aware of 
the subjective – what-it-is-like-to-have-them – quality of thoughts. The discrepancy between 
an awareness of the content of thought and the act of thinking that thought indicates that 
preschoolers do not yet understand that these private inner entities are necessarily generated, 
let alone self-generated. As such, “[f]or a child for whom the world of thought is largely 
causeless, any thought might occur at any time” (Flavell et al. 1995, p. 86). Given this, even 
if we endorse the premise that experiencing a thought necessitates thinking it, it does not 
follow that experiencing thoughts necessitates experiencing thinking: if by ‘experiencing 
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thinking’ one means experiencing it as thinking: for, as we have seen, this is not the case in 
preschoolers.  
Where S has cognitive abilities equivalent to the preschooler, S would not have formed 
the belief that they are thinking and are therefore the author of the content of the thoughts 
experienced. But how does this help us assess the legitimacy of selective scepticism regarding 
thought? Given S’s cognitive abilities, a lack of belief about the authorship of a thought is the 
case for any thought content experienced, not just for some: that one, say, but not this one. 
What the developmental literature reveals is that one’s belief about being the author of 
thought is not a given; it is something we acquire. Once acquired, the mechanism underlying 
this belief acquisition must function consistently. For selective doubt to occur, one could 
conjecture that this mechanism is functioning intermittently. This possibility will be explored 
in the next section with reference to the pathological condition known as thought insertion. 
 
6. Thought insertion 
Thought insertion is characterised by the subject’s attribution of their thoughts to someone 
else, such that “it is as if another’s thoughts have been engendered or inserted in them” 
(Cahill & Frith, 1996, p.278). As Gerrans (2001) further explains: 
 
[T]he subject has thoughts that she thinks are the thoughts of other people, somehow occurring in her 
own mind. It is not that the subject thinks that other people are making her think certain thoughts as if by 
hypnosis or psychokinesis, but that other people think the thoughts using the subject’s mind as a 
psychological medium. (p.231) 
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The subject claims that certain thoughts are being put into their mind, like “Kill God” 
(Frith, 1992, p.66). There is something about the occurrence of these thoughts specifically 
that leads the subject to believe that they have been inserted. What, then, is the means or 
mechanism by which the subject is discriminating between thoughts they doubt thinking and 
thoughts they do not?
12
 
A number of explanations of thought insertion have been proposed over the years. My 
intention, here, is not to critique these or provide any kind of review. Instead, by presenting 
suitable candidates from among these explanations, I aim to support the legitimacy of the 
proposition “I doubt that I think that thought but not this one” and so provide a way to justify, 
epistemically, selective scepticism. As a means to that end, I present explanations proffered 
by Fernández (2010) and Billon (2013). 
When considering the phenomenon of inserted thoughts, Fernández asks: What does 
the subject experience? In response, he states: she experiences a lack of commitment to a 
particular belief; a belief which, in virtue of this lack of commitment, is experienced as 
‘inserted’. To understand how this might come about, Fernández presents an account of how 
we typically become committed to our beliefs (concerning our thoughts and perceptions); 
something he refers to as the ‘bypass’ procedure or model of self-knowledge. As he explains: 
 
The bypass model of self-knowledge... is a view about what constitutes our epistemic grounds for 
believing that we have a certain belief. The view is that the mental states that constitute our evidence or 
                                                          
12
 In this paper, I am concerned with the act of doubting (qua not believing) ‘that p’ and not with believing ‘not 
p’. Those suffering from thought insertion often believe ‘not p’ – believe, that is, that they did not think these 
thoughts – rather than simply doubting (qua not believe) p: that they were the one thinking these thoughts. A 
prerequisite of believing ‘not p’, however, is doubting ‘that p’. For this reason, I consider the phenomenon of 
thought insertion to be pertinent to the issue of selective doubt. 
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grounds for a given belief (states such as our perceptual experiences or our memory experiences) perform 
a sort of double duty. They entitle us to have that belief, and they also constitute our evidence or grounds 
for the meta-belief that we have it. (2010, p.81) 
 
By his own admission, Fernández employs an “undemanding notion of epistemic 
justification” (ibid.) in which a belief is justified if it is a belief that regularly co-occurs with a 
particular mental state (e.g., the belief that there is a chair in front me is justified if it 
regularly co-occurs with the perception I have of a chair in front of me). Certainly, the 
epistemic relationship described here is not of the kind demanded by Descartes’ method of 
doubt (for example); Fernández does not require certainty, just reliability. The epistemic 
relationship employed within the ‘bypass model’ therefore seems compatible with selective 
scepticism. 
To explain: the ‘bypass’ process concerns the manner in which we acquire evidence 
to justify a particular belief we hold. Let us say that I perceive a chair in front of me. In doing 
so, I acquire the first-order belief with content ‘there is a chair in front of me’. Given this is 
the case, consider the extent to which the following two questions differ: (i) Do you believe 
that there is a chair in front of you? (ii) Is there a chair in front of you? Based on the level of 
epistemic justification we are operating at, it would make little sense to answer ‘yes’ to one 
and ‘no’ to the other. One’s response to the question “Is there a chair in front of you?” reveals 
one’s belief on the matter. Thus, when asked “Do you believe that there is a chair in front of 
you?”, I do not need to introspect and search out my belief; rather, I turn my gaze outward to 
see if there is indeed a chair there. What justifies my belief (my meta-belief: believing that I 
have the first-order belief) such that I feel justified in believing that there is a chair in front of 
me is the same evidence that justifies my first-order belief with content ‘there is a chair in 
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front of me’. When answering (i), I bypass the need to introspect in order to justify my meta-
belief, and in fact answer the question using the same process I would use when responding 
to (ii). 
Under normal circumstances, when answering ‘yes’ to the question “Is there a chair in 
front of you?”, I am committed to the belief – my meta-belief – that there is a chair in front of 
me (I meta-believe that there is a chair in front of me; recall the explanation of Moore’s 
paradox in Section 4; see also Evans, 1982; Williams, 2004). Similarly, if I am thinking about 
chairs and their relative location to me, typically, I am committed to the following: “I meta-
believe I am thinking about chairs... (etc.)”. Through ‘bypass’ the epistemic justification for 
one’s first-order belief and one’s meta-belief is the same (again, based on the relatively 
undemanding epistemic justification we are operating at, which is compatible with D3); but, 
more than this, one’s meta-belief acts to endorse the content of one’s first-order belief: one is 
committed to its content as something one believes. What Fernández suggests in the case of 
thought insertion, however, is that the subject cannot always commit to a first-order belief 
based on the process of ‘bypass’. 
Where there is disruption in the process of ‘bypass’, the same evidence used to justify 
the first-order belief corresponding to the presence of a chair in front of me no longer 
provides sufficient justification for the meta-belief “I believe that there is a chair in front of 
me”. In the absence of such a meta-belief, the thought I am experiencing with content “there 
is a chair in front of me” does not correspond to any meta-belief I possess – in contrast to 
what would be the case if the process of ‘bypass’ were working normally – and so is not 
recognized by me as a thought I have initiated. By not committing to the first-order belief, I 
do not endorse it. Consequently, I doubt that I am its author. 
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What remains unclear, however, is how the disruption in ‘bypass’ – which results in a 
lack of commitment and endorsement – manifests itself to the subject, such that it should be 
experienced as ‘inserted’, and whether this change is the means by which discrimination in 
authorship occurs. Is there, for example, a change in the subjective quality of the experience 
of the first-order belief, and is it this qualitative shift that justifies (at least to the subject) 
selective scepticism? It is not clear from Fernández’s account what the evidence is (again, 
from the subject’s perspective) that justifies the lack of commitment to the first-order belief 
and so justifies that that thought does not correspond to a (meta-) belief I possess, which then 
allows me to doubt it is a thought I was thinking. There is, of course, the possibility that the 
failure to commit occurs at the subpersonal level (although, given the absence of research, 
such a possibility remains unsubstantiated). In short, what remains unresolved is what it is 
like (if it is like anything) for a failure in ‘bypass’ to occur and whether this change acts as a 
means of discriminating between thoughts, and so as a means of justifying the kind of 
selective scepticism we are discussing here. 
Interestingly, Billon (2013) proffers just such a qualitative shift as a mean of 
identifying and therefore distinguishing ‘inserted’ from ‘non-inserted’ thoughts. Billon 
acknowledges that subjects are reflexively aware of putatively inserted thoughts – insofar as 
they have adequate introspective access to them – and also that they accept that these 
thoughts occur within the boundary of their experience (constitutive of their perspective; 
again, as required by D3). However, for Billon, what inserted thoughts are not is 
phenomenally conscious. Typically, thoughts, in virtue of occurring within the bounds of my 
perspective, are accompanied by a certain something-it-is-like-for-me to have them (as 
touched on previously), thereby making the thought phenomenally conscious. This quality, 
one might conjecture, increases my commitment to the thought (the first-order belief), in 
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keeping with Fernández’s account, and so contributes to the formation of the corresponding 
meta-belief with the same content (again, as described by Fernández). What is missing, in the 
case of thought insertion, Billon conjectures, is this phenomenal quality, such that (as subject) 
there is nothing-it-is-like-for-me to have these thoughts. What I experience, then, is a thought 
I have normal introspective access to, occurring within my perspective, but for which there is 
nothing-it-is-like-for-me to have the thought (recall the extract presented in Section 1, taken 
from the patient suffering from thought insertion, in which she described something feeling 
different in the case of the putatively inserted thought). The lack of phenomenal quality 
corresponds to a qualitative shift, I contend, which one might surmise, in virtue of the 
absence of phenomenal consciousness (or even a salient sense of its loss with regard to that 
thought) means that there is insufficient evidence to justify any commitment to the thought 
(the first-order belief). 
Something to consider, of course, is whether the lack of phenomenal consciousness is 
the result of a failure to commit to the first-order belief (which is compatible with a higher-
order thought theorist’s approach to phenomenal consciousness in which a higher-order 
thought (meta-belief) is necessary for phenomenal consciousness) or whether, as the result of 
some form of disruption, there occurs a lack of phenomenal consciousness which would 
normally accompany the first-order belief (as posited by first-order thought theorists), the 
absence of which prevents one’s commitment, or perhaps further reinforces one’s lack of 
commitment, to the thought. Billon’s position would seem to be more compatible with the 
latter view.  
As a final point, it is worth emphasising that, throughout this paper, the epistemic 
justification I have sought is merely that which justifies one’s selective doubt; in other words, 
that which provides a reason to be sceptical over one’s authorship of certain thoughts. I am 
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not trying to defend a stronger position in which the subject is justified in believing ‘not p’ 
(as opposed to doubting – qua not believing – p). After all, one could have a reason to be 
sceptical about p without having a sufficient and therefore justified reason to believe ‘not p’. 
In the case of thought insertion, the subject typically makes the stronger claim: “I believe ‘not 
p’” (namely, I believe that this thought is not something I think). My selective use of 
explanations of thought insertion is therefore purely instrumental, insofar as drawing on these 
explanatory accounts allows me to conjecture over the mechanism(s) that may impact one’s 
belief system. Such impact, I contend, is enough to justify doubt over the authorship of some 
thoughts – at least from the point of view of the subject – as it provides the subject with 
sufficient evidence (and therefore reason) to doubt the authorship of those thoughts; but I 
would not go so far as to say that what has been presented here justifies the belief that one is 
not the author of certain thoughts. 
 
7. Conclusion 
In conclusion, what I hope to have shown in this paper is that there are epistemic grounds to 
justify selective scepticism over the authorship of one’s thoughts, thereby making the 
proposition – “I doubt that I think that thought but not this one” – legitimate. Even where one 
accepts the entailment between a thought and its thinker (culminating in a particular 
ontological position), there is nevertheless a case to be made for epistemic discrepancy 
sufficient to invite and even justify the kind of selective scepticism discussed here. Whilst the 
argument presented has drawn on respected empirical work in the field of child development, 
strongly suggesting the acquisition of certain beliefs regarding thought and oneself as thinker 
(as opposed to this being a given), I nevertheless acknowledge that the same argument has 
selectively drawn on more speculative work, specifically regarding explanations of thought 
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insertion (pace these authors). My aim in presenting some of these tentative claims has been 
merely to proffer conjecture: to speculate over what form the mechanisms underlying 
selective scepticism might take and, subsequently, what might constitute the epistemic basis 
for this scepticism. 
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